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Beyond Posted Prices: The Past, Present, and Future of  
Participative Pricing Mechanisms 
 
0. Contribution Statement 
Driven by the low transaction costs and interactive nature of the internet, customer participation 
in the price-setting process has increased. These changes were first brought about by the rise of 
online auctions in the early 2000s, followed by the emergence of newer participative mechanisms. 
Today, platforms such as eBay have popularized online auctions on a global scale, Priceline has 
made headlines with its name-your-own-price (NYOP) business model, and Humble Bundle has 
enabled independent musicians and game developers to market their works through pay-what-you-
want (PWYW) pricing. Advertising exchanges conduct several hundred million individual 
auctions per day to sell online advertising slots. These are just a few examples of participative 
pricing in transactions among consumers or businesses. In parallel, academic research on 
participative pricing has blossomed in recent years, with an overarching concern over the 
profitability and other marketing implications these mechanisms have on sellers and buyers.  
 The present paper contributes to this literature in three ways. First, we propose a definition 
of participative pricing mechanisms, as well as a useful taxonomy. Second, we discuss the current 
understanding by synthesizing conceptual and empirical academic literature. Third, we outline 
promising research questions with a key focus on the related behavioral aspects of buyers and 
sellers. 
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1. Introduction 
Almost 150 years since John Wanamaker introduced the first price tag to discourage haggling, 
buyers again have a say in the prices they pay. This resurgence of buyer participation in the price-
setting process is driven in part by the internet, where buyers and sellers can interact at little to no 
cost. Moreover, the falling costs of implementing a participative pricing mechanism, such as an 
auction, have broadened the scope of participative mechanisms from their historical niche 
applications to almost all mainstream consumer products such as durables and services (Pinker, 
Seidmann, and Vakrat 2003). The scope broadening is not limited to auctions—new pricing 
techniques in which the buyer takes center stage, such as name-your-own-price (NYOP) or pay-
what-you-want (PWYW), have emerged, both online and in traditional brick-and-mortar retail 
environments (Krämer et al. 2017).  
From the standpoint of a seller, the thought of introducing a pricing mechanism that grants 
some control to buyers rests on a thorough understanding of their likely behavior. Classical auction 
theory provides a starting point, but humans are known to systematically deviate from behaviors 
implied by standard microeconomic assumptions. Behavioral economics and consumer behavior 
help provide richer and more realistic theories of buyer behavior. 
The goal of this review article is to provide the conceptual and empirical background from 
the academic literature on participative pricing, define a comprehensive taxonomy, and outline 
promising research questions with a special focus on realistic models of buyer behavior. In 
section 2 below, we suggest a definition and a taxonomy for participative pricing mechanisms. We 
then use the taxonomy to organize our discussion of participative pricing mechanisms in sections 
3 and 4. Section 5 discusses outcome and process utility in participative pricing as an important 
example of a behaviorally realistic model. Section 6 discusses industry-specific applications of 
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participative pricing mechanisms in business-to-business (B2B) domains, advertising, and charity. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background and Taxonomy 
Consider a potential trade of a product, initially owned by a seller who faces one or more buyers. 
For example, the product may be a baseball card a collector offers for sale in an eBay auction. Or 
the product may be a hotel room Priceline offers in its NYOP channel, with Priceline being the 
seller and a traveler playing the role of the buyer. Or the product may be a bridge-building contract 
a state government (the seller) offers in a procurement reverse auction, with contractors playing 
the roles of buyers. 
We use the term participative pricing mechanisms to reflect the core idea that buyers help 
determine the final price of a product by means of a bid or offer. Moreover, we define a 
participative pricing mechanism according to the following two criteria: 
I. A potential buyer submits a binding bid or an offer for a product. 
II. The rules of the mechanism map each bid or offer to a probability in the interval [0%, 
100%] that the potential buyer receives the product. 
The probability range merits clarification. First, not having probabilistic acceptance, that is, 
accepting all offers or rejecting all offers, is included in that [0%, 100%] interval. But many 
interesting mechanisms, including auctions, bargaining, and NYOP selling, result in probabilities 
of acceptance that are greater than zero but less than 1.  
We offer a taxonomy (see Table 1) to classify different participative pricing mechanisms along 
the following two dimensions:  
1) Competition among potential buyers for the same object: whether the outcome depends on 
the action of other (potential) buyers.  
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2) Extent of interactivity after the buyer submits the bid, where “interactive” mechanisms give 
the seller an active role in the outcome and “not interactive” mechanisms do not. 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of participative pricing mechanisms 
  Competition among potential buyers 
  No Yes 
Interactivity 
after 
bidding 
Interactive 
Name your own price 
(NYOP), Bargaining 
Auctions with active seller 
participation (e.g., a hidden 
reserve price) 
Not Interactive 
Pay what you want 
(PWYW) 
Auctions without active 
seller participation (e.g., a 
public reserve price) 
 
Following Table 1, we identify four types of participative pricing mechanisms: (1) NYOP 
auctions (and other forms of bargaining) in which the seller actively decides whether to accept the 
buyer’s offer after receiving it, and the outcome for one buyer is independent of other buyers’ 
actions (e.g., NYOP auctions for hotels at the online travel intermediary Priceline.com); (2) 
auctions with a seller who reserves the right to reject bids after seeing them (e.g., used-car auctions 
at Manheim1 or auctions for a flight upgrade such as Lufthansa’s “MyOffer”2); (3) mechanisms 
whereby the outcome for one buyer is independent of other buyers, and the seller is passive (e.g., 
PWYW); and (4) auctions with a public reserve whereby the outcome depends on buyers’ bids, 
and the seller is committed to accepting offers according to a published and deterministic algorithm 
(e.g., eBay auctions without a hidden reserve price set by the seller before the auction starts). 
                                                     
1  https://www.manheim.com/publicauctions/sales.do 
2  At this auction, passengers with a ticket can submit a (binding) bid for an upgrade (if available) until 72 hours prior 
to departure. Lufthansa informs bidders 24-36 hours prior to departure whether their bid was accepted 
(http://www.lufthansa.com/de/de/myOffer). Other airlines also use this mechanism (http://www.plusgrade.com).  
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The role of competition with other buyers in the taxonomy is obvious: in mechanisms with 
competition, the buyers are engaged in a strategic interaction, and some concept of equilibrium is 
essential for modeling their behavior. The role of interactivity in the taxonomy introduces an 
analogous and additional level of strategic complexity to the buyer’s decision making, because 
buyers need to form a belief about the expected behavior of the seller. Note that in both (1) and 
(2), the seller’s involvement may be literal or facilitated by a computer algorithm, and the key 
buyer-side distinction of seller involvement is the increased strategic complexity of the decision 
and increased uncertainty about the outcome. 
Bertini and Koenigsberg (2014) and Kim, Natter, and Spann (2009) suggested previous 
taxonomies and classifications of participative pricing mechanisms. Our goal is to focus on the 
common and differentiating elements of these mechanisms, in particular, the behavioral issues 
inherent in employing each. We start with a discussion of the mechanisms in the order they are 
shown in Table 1.  
3. Participative Pricing without Buyer Competition: NYOP, Bargaining, and PWYW 
We briefly review previous research on participative pricing mechanisms without competition 
among buyers. As Table 1 indicates, NYOP, bargaining, and PWYW all fall within this category. 
Under these mechanisms, a single buyer generates and submits a price or an offer for a product, 
and the buyer’s chances of receiving the product do not depend on the actions of other buyers, if 
any. Under NYOP and bargaining, the seller has some final control over the transaction via the 
right to accept or reject the transaction upon receiving the buyer’s submitted price; hence, the 
submitted price is typically termed a “bid” or “offer,” and the acceptance probability is typically 
less than 100%. By contrast, under PWYW, the transaction is unconditional, so the buyer can buy 
at any price of his or her choice, including zero, with a 100% acceptance probability by design. 
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3.1. Name Your Own Price 
NYOP can be seen as a reverse version of traditional posted pricing: under the traditional 
mechanism, the seller posts a price, which the buyer then accepts or rejects; under NYOP, the two 
parties swap their roles in the same sequence of actions. As Hinz, Hann, and Spann. (2011, p. 81) 
introduced,  
In contrast to a typical retail setting, in NYOP markets, it is the buyer who places an 
initial offer. This offer is accepted if it is above some threshold price set by the seller. 
If the initial offer is rejected, the buyer can update her offer in subsequent rounds. By 
design, the final purchase price is opaque to the public; the price paid depends on the 
individual buyer’s willingness-to-pay and offer strategy.  
Because NYOP requires initial price generation and submission from the buyer, as well as a 
subsequent accept/reject response from the seller, it benefits from a transaction environment that 
allows efficient communication between the two sides. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the rise of the 
internet in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to the emergence of some prominent NYOP sellers. 
In fact, NYOP received widespread attention when Priceline.com pioneered it in 1997.  
Research on NYOP has employed diverse methodologies, such as empirical data analysis, 
field and laboratory experimentation, as well as analytical economic modeling. The central 
research question is whether NYOP could be a more profitable pricing mechanism than traditional 
posted pricing—and relatedly, what kind of transaction environment and design features would be 
conducive to the profitability of NYOP. Shapiro’s (2011) general analysis of a model that 
incorporates buyers’ risk attitude (i.e., the impact of uncertainty on buyers) shows NYOP is often 
more profitable than posted price. Shapiro and Zillante’s (2009) experimental study on NYOP 
produced similarly positive conclusions. Wang, Gal-Or, and Chatterjee (2009) obtained separate 
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analytical evidence on how NYOP could improve profitability via its impact on inventory 
management in a channel setting in the travel industry. On the other hand, several papers find 
NYOP can at best match posted prices (Zeithammer 2015) or is weakly dominated by posted prices 
(Fay 2004, 2009). Therefore, whether NYOP outperforms posted prices is still an open research 
question. 
A specific line of research focuses on the profitability impact of strategic buyer decisions in 
response to NYOP, in particular, repeated bidding, which could be seen as a form of haggling. 
Using analytical modeling supplemented by empirical data, Terwiesch, Savin, and Hann (2005) 
found evidence that an NYOP retailer could engage in online haggling to improve profits, by 
achieving finer market segmentation and thus price discrimination. Fay (2004) found repeated 
bidding could have a non-intuitive profit impact on the seller, and the seller should encourage it 
under some conditions. Nonetheless, previous empirical research points out online haggling could 
introduce substantial frictional and search costs to the transactions (Hann and Terwiesch 2003; 
Spann, Skiera, and Schäfers 2004).  
Another direction of research focuses on optimal design under NYOP. Amaldoss and Jain 
(2008) showed how allowing consumers to place joint bids on multiple items could be more 
profitable for the seller. Hinz et al. (2011) suggested a profitable strategy for the seller is to employ 
an adaptive, transparent threshold, and to set a positive entry fee. Hinz and Spann (2008) pointed 
out that because an NYOP seller typically has a secret reserve price, information about that reserve 
price, which diffuses in consumers’ social networks, could have a significant impact on the seller’s 
profit.  
Meanwhile, consumer behavior researchers have investigated the psychological impact of 
NYOP-type participative pricing mechanisms on consumers. Chernev (2003) found consumers 
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could be less inclined to name a price, compared with choosing from among a list of posted prices 
for purchase. Spann and Tellis (2006) showed bidders partially deviate from rational bidding in 
NYOP auctions. Chandran and Morwitz (2005) suggested participative pricing mechanisms such 
as NYOP could increase the consumer’s perceived control over the shopping situation. In a wider 
sense, these studies help us understand the impact of “process utility” on consumers under 
participative pricing mechanisms. 
Future research on NYOP may try to gain a better understanding of the outcome and process 
utility of NYOP as well as why its prevalence is still limited.3 See our related section 5 below.  
 The optimal design of NYOP accounting for potential non-rational behavior of bidders is 
another promising area of research in this domain, because most papers on optimal design assume 
bidders are rational. One key element of NYOP auctions is the uncertainty of bid acceptance for 
bidders. Therefore, how bidders may deviate from rationality in their formation of beliefs about 
the uncertain acceptance of bids as well as their uncertainty-related preferences is unclear. 
3.2. Bargaining 
In settings such as bazaars, garage sales, flea markets, and other transaction contexts (Evans and 
Beltramini 1987), consumers negotiate prices. In addition, high-value products such as homes, 
automobiles, furniture, and appliances are commonly subject to bargaining or negotiation over 
prices as well as other value-added services (e.g., financing, delivery, warranty, installation). 
Negotiation is a complex social process involving posturing, social interactions, and consumer 
orientations (Evans and Beltramini 1987) that determine the bargainer’s strength and success in 
the negotiation process. 
                                                     
3  Priceline has a patent on this mechanism in the United States. Although this patent does not extend to Europe, 
trademark rights do, which may be one reason other companies are hesitant to adopt the mechanism. 
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The bargaining literature is particularly relevant in B2B settings, such as bargaining by 
channel members. Biyalogorsky and Koenigsberg (2010) study a setting wherein channel members 
have to decide which firm will own the units until demand uncertainty is resolved. They find 
negotiations between the manufacturer and the retailer can lead to the first-best outcome, but only 
under quite restrictive constraints that include direct side payments by the retailer to the 
manufacturer and the retailer being pessimistic about its outside option during the negotiation. 
Haruvy, Katok, and Pavlov (2016) tackle the possibility that the failure to coordinate in a 
channel setting is the result of bargaining-related behavioral motives. They propose and develop a 
behavioral model based on reciprocal concessions that explains empirical patterns in bargaining 
between channel members. In particular, they noted experiment participants in the role of 
manufacturers tend to make many offers that gradually increase retailer surplus by deliberately 
starting out with an inefficient offer in order to be able to make relatively costless concessions, as 
opposed to starting out with an efficient offer and making costly concessions. They find process 
modifications—such as allowing for reciprocal concessions—can drastically improve efficiency.  
As the understanding of bargaining solutions grows and the literature proposes new 
mechanisms, new questions for future research in bargaining are emerging in two directions. First, 
the realization is growing that bargaining is not simply a standalone mechanism that warrants a 
specialized set of solutions. Rather, bargaining could be thought of as part of a process that may 
include the other participative pricing approaches we discuss. For example, an NYOP mechanism 
(section 3.1) may lead to a rejection, but that rejection may be followed up with a counteroffer or 
an invitation to try again (as Priceline does when it rejects an offer). Likewise, at the conclusion 
of an auction (section 4), a seller may approach losing bidders and offer them another item at a 
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lower price. eBay formalizes this concept as a “second-chance offer.”4 Similarly, an auction in a 
B2B setting (section 6.1) could result in more bargaining, either in the form of seeking additional 
concessions from the winning supplier or in squeezing competing suppliers for concessions. Such 
“second-chance offers” can increase bidder’s propensity to enter a participative pricing mechanism 
as they may increase the expected chance of success in these mechanisms. 
A second direction for future research questions involves a choice between bargaining 
formats. A critical concept in bargaining is the concept of bargaining power, which roughly 
translates to how advantaged a party is in the bargaining. As a simple illustration, consider Gneezy 
et al. (2003), who illustrate bargaining position could shift with the simple addition of a deadline. 
A proposer in that paper was the advantaged party until a deadline was added, which shifted the 
bargaining advantage to the responder. Haruvy et al. (2016) likewise showed adding the ability to 
respond to an offer with a counteroffer might shift the bargaining advantage from the manufacturer 
to the retailer. Thus, a critical avenue for future research is to address how the bargaining format 
is determined. If parties can bargain over the outcome, we have no reason to assume they will not 
bargain over the format or mechanism to determine that outcome.  
3.3. Pay What You Want 
Asking people to pay what they want (or can) to a church’s collection plate, at a school fundraiser, 
or a public radio pledge drive is not uncommon. In fact, one of the most fundamental problems 
investigated in economics is the design of and behavior in voluntary contribution mechanisms 
(VCM), wherein people need to determine what amount to contribute to a public good, and where 
                                                     
4  See http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/second_chance_offer.html: “When you send a Second Chance Offer, you give 
the bidder the chance to buy the item at a Buy It Now price equal to their last bid amount. It's up to the buyer to 
decide whether to accept the offer.” 
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the dominant selfish strategy appears to be contributing nothing at all (Isaac and Walker 1988, 
Masclet et al. 2003, Boschet et al. 2006, Carpenter 2007). 
Different from VCM, the PWYW mechanism applies to the voluntary payment for a product 
for private as well as public consumption, although the public-good connotation is sometimes 
apparent.  
Examples include music busking on streets and, arguably, museums with nominally free 
admission but pleas for voluntary payment at the entrance. The internet, with its ability to reach 
out to a large potential market with ease, facilitated the spread of this pricing mechanism. For 
example, the British band Radiohead made headlines in 2007 by making a new album available 
online under PWYW (Elberse and Bergsman 2008); because music albums by established artists 
were traditionally sold with fixed, posted prices, Radiohead’s move became a talking point and 
public relations stunt by virtue of its deviation from industry conventions. However, Radiohead’s 
PWYW was not widely followed in the mainstream music industry. Rather, online PWYW has 
become a way by which less well-known independent music artists—in fact, creative industry 
aspirants in general, including game developers—could gain market exposure with some 
immediate revenue gain. Additionally, PWYW can be used to sell software on online platforms 
such as the Humble Bundle website (Bertini and Koenigsberg 2014; Chen, Koenigsberg, and 
Zhang, forthcoming) or for article processing charges (APCs) in (gold) open access publishing 
(Spann, Stich, and Schmidt, forthcoming).  
Field evidence has shown PWYW indeed could generate substantial positive revenues (Kim 
et al. 2009, 2010). Much research has focused on the behavioral factors that could influence 
payments, such as perceived norms regarding fairness, altruism, and reciprocity (see Bertini and 
Koenigsberg [2014] and Schmidt et al. [2015]), as well as the presence of reference prices (e.g., 
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Kunter 2015). Some of the striking results in this line of research are that payments could be 
significantly improved when consumers know that what they pay will be partially channeled to 
charitable causes (Gneezy et al. 2010) or could foster their self-image (Gneezy et al. 2012). Apart 
from the purely normative or psychological causes, consumers might also pay under PWYW with 
the strategic intention to keep the PWYW seller in the market (Schmidt et al. 2015). Mak et al. 
(2015) provided analytical and experimental evidence on how this motivation could transform 
PWYW into a major variant of VCM with threshold public-good provision (Croson and Marks 
2000) and lead to long-term profitability for the seller. Mak et al. (2015) further showed how 
consumer communication could facilitate this possibility in practice. 
PWYW, gift giving, and donations are closely related, because all three can be grouped as 
voluntary payment mechanisms (see the discussion in Natter and Kaufmann, 2015). In fact, 
PWYW can be seen as donations with a clearly defined immediate gain for the donor. The 
relationship with donation behavior implies PWYW is subject to a host of social psychological 
factors that have been studied in the larger literature concerning donations, but await research on 
their specific roles in PWYW. On the other hand, PWYW also connects with other participative 
pricing mechanisms such as NYOP. Recently, the experimental research by Krämer et al. (2017) 
has noted how both NYOP and PWYW can achieve different degrees of price discrimination as 
well as market penetration in a competitive market, complementing similar work on PWYW by 
Schmidt et al. (2015). 
More research is needed to determine which participative pricing mechanism (e.g., NYOP, 
PWYW, or auctions with buyer competition) is best suited for specific situations (e.g., based on 
product characteristics or the competitive situation of the seller(s)), as well as how effective each 
mechanism is in price discrimination, market penetration, and competition. Further, the role of 
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uncertainty in PWYW pricing requires a more nuanced study. In addition to the seller’s uncertainty 
in the payment amount received from the buyer, buyers can face “endogenous” uncertainty related 
to the price they pay and the seller's reaction to it: in addition to sellers’ subsequent entry decisions, 
buyers’ payment may influence the quality of the product they receive (e.g., in case of payment 
before the service). A related research question concerns the timing of the payment (before or after 
the service) in the price-setting stage.  
 
4. Participative Pricing with Buyer Competition: Auctions 
This section focuses on auctions, which are participative pricing mechanisms with buyer 
competition. Buyer competition in participative pricing results in increased competitive intensity, 
which in turn results in specific types of emotions, such as competitive arousal and desire to win. 
As a result, studying how the competitive intensity and related emotions influence bidder behavior 
and willingness to pay (WTP) as well as factors that moderate or mediate this relationship is 
important. Another related issue is the dependencies between competing auctions that may run 
simultaneously or sequentially. An important consideration for auction sellers is to determine the 
best way to sell items in multiple auctions (i.e., simultaneous, sequential, or partially overlapping 
auctions), and what factors influence this decision. 
4.1. Auctions with and without active seller participation 
Table 1 distinguishes between auctions according to whether the seller can actively participate 
after the buyer submitted a bid. Auctions without the seller’s active participation are auctions in 
which the seller determines the auction mechanism (e.g., a public reserve price) but has no 
influence over the outcome after the auction has started. This format is in contrast to auctions in 
which the seller has direct influence over the outcome, such as auctions with a secret reserve, 
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where the seller has the right to refuse a bid, and in most B2B auctions.5 B2B auctions will be 
discussed in section 6.1. 
Little research has investigated the difference between auctions with and without active 
seller participation. Some related research has looked at the effect of secret reserve prices in 
auctions.6 Research has shown a secret reserve may result in reduced bidder entry, because bidders 
may form an expectation that the level of the reserve is above their WTP, which in turn leads to 
lower selling prices (Vincent 1995, Katkar and Reiley 2006). However, secret reserves may have 
a positive effect on ending prices, because they may act as additional bidders (Elyakime et al. 
1994). Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) reported higher selling prices in auctions with secret reserves 
compared to open reserves. Another tool that provides sellers with input, introduced in 2005 by 
eBay auctions, is the best-offer mechanism. In auctions with a best-offer option, a bidder can make 
an offer on an item, after which the seller has the option to accept or reject the offer, or to make a 
counteroffer. Little or no research has been conducted examining this mechanism, though a 
significant amount of research has focused on a similar mechanism, NYOP (discussed in section 
3.1). 
4.2. Bidder behavior and auction design 
We restrict our attention to a simple auction, which is a pricing mechanism whereby bidders submit 
bids, and one of the bidders wins and pays a price based on his bid. More complex auctions allocate 
                                                     
5  As noted in section 2, many B2B auctions are procurement reverse auctions in which the product to be sold is, for 
example, a bridge-building contract offered by a state government (the seller), with contractors playing the roles of 
buyers. 
6  In most local (and B2B) auctions, the seller (buyer) has an option to reject a high bid when a secret reserve price is 
used. However, in eBay auctions, the seller needs to pre-specify the level of the reserve, and the outcome is binding 
as soon as the secret reserve is met.  
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more than one unit of a good, allow multi-dimensional bids, and so on. Although various complex 
auction formats and auction features exist beyond the scope of the present work, all auctions are 
clearly a participative pricing mechanisms in the strict sense of meeting the two criteria we 
specified. Instead of trying to cover many different formats and features, we focus on one 
behaviorally important distinction within simple auctions: the difference between sealed-bid and 
open auctions. In an open auction, bidders submit bids throughout the auction until termination. 
With sealed bidding, participating bidders independently submit bids; the highest bidder wins and 
pays his bid. Although both forms are participative according to the two criteria we highlighted, 
the open auction has additional strength as an empowering mechanism.  
Empowerment. From a behavioral perspective, a participative pricing mechanism bestows 
on the consumer a sense of control and empowerment. Wathieu et al. (2002) provide a 
comprehensive summary of the characteristics constituting consumer empowerment. Their work 
did not deal with pricing in that mix, but was rather focused on the consumer ability to control the 
choice set and attributes. Nevertheless, many of these empowerment characteristics they listed 
hold for pricing as well. Specifically, they identified three components of consumer empowerment: 
(1) control, (2) progress cues, and (3) information about other consumers. In the context of auctions, 
control, according to Wathieu et al. (2002), implies a consumer’s ability to specify and adjust, 
which naturally maps the process of bidding to participative pricing. The desire for control leads 
to the second characteristic of consumer empowerment: progress cues. In open auctions, 
consumers can track the progress of bidding and can respond in real time to changes in information, 
whether this information involves other bids or other auctions (Pilehvar, Elmaghraby, and Gopal 
2016). In general, an auction will be perceived as bestowing greater empowerment when the 
pricing mechanism is perceived as being more extended, complex, adaptive, and open ended (the 
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criteria Wathieu et al. [2002] identified as important for progress cues). Again, open auctions are 
advantaged relative to sealed-bid auctions. Lastly, to create perceived control, one must provide 
information about other consumers’ bids to the extent possible. Open auctions provide feedback 
about others’ bids before the auction is concluded, making it of greater participative value, 
according to the empowerment criteria identified by Wathieu et al. (2002). In the context of eBay 
auctions, Zeithammer and Adams (2010) provide indirect evidence for the importance of 
empowerment to consumers, by showing even last-minute bids by the two highest bidders in each 
auction cannot be interpreted as if they came from a sealed-bid auction, despite eBay encouraging 
sealed bidding via the “proxy bid” system (i.e., eBay recommends bidders place a proxy bid equal 
to their WTP, and have the proxy bidding system bid on their behalf). Instead, most eBay bidders 
seem to value the above three elements of empowerment, and bid in reactive fashion all the way 
to the end of the auction. 
Emotions. The empowerment aspect of participative pricing in auctions cannot be considered 
in isolation from emotions and the value of excitement that auctions bestow on consumers due to 
participative pricing. According to Bapna, Goes, and Gupta (2001), consumers’ desire to 
experience a “bazaar-like competitive atmosphere” drives their purchase decisions (p. 44). Stafford 
and Stern (2002) argued the emotions bidders experience in online auctions are themselves a 
source of added utility compared to non-participative formats. Lee, Kim, and Fairhurst (2009, p. 
93) argued the “thrill of bidding, excitement of winning, [and the] stimulation of beating 
competitors” are key in consumers’ preference for auctions. Herschlag and Zwick (2000) claimed 
that “winning is the aphrodisiac that gets the shopping juices flowing” (p. 170). Astor et al. (2013) 
tested this emotion argument with skin conductance response (SCR) and heart rate (HR) as proxies 
for both the intensity and the valence of emotions. They demonstrate—in sealed-bid auctions—
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that the HR responses when losing an auction are stronger than when winning an auction, whereas 
winning an auction induces a stronger SCR compared with losing an auction. Such physiological 
evidence for the psychological effects of participative pricing is increasingly important in 
academic research on participative pricing, which is not surprising given the convergence to an 
academic consensus that the value of participative pricing is in large part emotional. Haruvy and 
Popkowski Leszczyc (2010b) argued the critical aspect to consider in determining auction 
outcomes is “the dynamic interaction among bidders in an ascending bid auction” (p. 100). 
Accordingly, Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc (2016) modeled a complex four-component 
auction process that involves (1) the choice between auctions, (2) the timing of the bid, (3) the bid 
amount, and (4) the payment for the auction. Within that process, they found competitive responses 
to be an important determinant of bidding behavior. More generally, the literature has identified 
accelerated competitive reactions as “competitive arousal,” or alternatively as “auction fever.” 
With competitive arousal, the bidders’ “adrenaline starts to rush, their emotions block their ability 
to think clearly, and they end up bidding much more than they ever envisioned” (Murnighan 2002, 
p. 63). Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2005) provided extensive empirical evidence for 
competitive arousal from live and internet bidding, survey data, and laboratory experiments. They 
concluded competitive arousal from open auctions results in higher bids and revenues.  
Competitive intensity. Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2016) studied the effect of speed of 
competitor reaction (how fast a bidder is outbid by another bidder) on WTP in an auction. Results 
from five experiments provide strong support that faster speed of competitive reaction results in a 
higher WTP. Furthermore, they showed this effect is mediated by the perceived competitive 
intensity of the auction, which in turn increases a bidder’s desire to win the auction, resulting in 
more persistent bidding and a higher WTP. In addition, they showed the effect of the speed of 
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competitor reaction is distinct from competitive arousal, any impact due to time pressure or auction 
duration, inferences about the product’s value, or the nature and number of   competing bidders.  
Behavior in a sequence of auctions. Emotions are important both within and across auctions, 
particularly when auctions are in sequence. Ding et al. (2005) identified the resulting sequential 
dependencies due to bidder emotions. They examined the role of bidder emotions in a NYOP 
mechanism they specifically identify as a degenerate form of a reverse auction. In that context, 
they provided a formal representation of the emotions evoked by the auction process, specifically, 
the excitement of winning if a bid is accepted, and the frustration of losing if it is not. They then 
generated and empirically tested a number of insights related to (1) the impact of expected 
excitement at winning, and frustration at losing, on bids across consumers and bidding scenarios, 
and (2) the dynamic nature of the bidding behavior, that is, how winning and losing in previous 
auctions influence subsequent bids. They report bidder frustration and a decreased propensity to 
bid after losing an auction. Emotion-driven sequential dependency is also evident in Pilehvar et al. 
(2016). Using data from auctions hosted on an online B2B platform, Pilehvar et al. (2016) show 
bidders are influenced by prices from their own previous bidding behavior as well as concurrent 
prices in other auctions relative to the focal auction.  
Dependencies between simultaneous and sequential auctions. Several papers have studied 
simultaneous and sequential ascending-bid auctions. Simultaneous auctions are fully overlapping 
and allow for bidders to cross-bid or switch among auctions. Cross-bidding among simultaneous 
auctions has been empirically observed (Anwar, McMillan, and Zheng 2006; Haruvy and 
Popkowski Leszczyc 2010; Haruvy, Popkowski Leszczyc, and Ma 2014) and results in increased 
bidders and bids in both auctions, and thus tends to increase sellers’ revenues (Beil and Wein 2009). 
In addition, empirical results find cross-bidders pay less than non-cross-bidders in eBay auctions 
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(Answer et al. 2006). Haruvy, Popkowski Leszczyc, and Ma (2014) studied simultaneous and 
partial overlapping auctions. They found the degree of overlap between auctions, the number of 
simultaneous auctions, and information transparency influence bidding behavior and auction 
outcome. Further analyses of clickstream data (search) indicated bidder search mediates the latter 
effect on price dispersion. 
Bidding in sequential auctions differs because bidders can only bid in one auction at a time, 
but when placing bids, they tend to take into account information about future auctions (i.e., they 
are forward-looking), resulting in less aggressive bidding and lower prices in earlier auctions 
(Zeithammer 2006). Zeithammer (2007a, b) expanded this work by incorporating sellers’ learning, 
where sellers either decide to host future auctions, based on prices from previous auctions 
(Zeithammer 2007a), or some sellers learn whereas others do not, and commit to hold additional 
auctions at the beginning of the game (Zeithammer 2007b). However, bidder learning about 
product values from preceding auctions reduces uncertainty, which tends to result in aggressive 
bidding (and higher prices) in later auctions (Kagel and Levin 1986; Kim and Che 2004). 
Sequential dependencies within open auctions. Haruvy and Popkowsky Leszczyc (2010a) 
and Lim, Haruvy, and Popkowsky Leszczyc (2016) characterized sequential dependencies within 
open auctions. Lim et al. (2016) showed current information displayed on concurrent auctions 
affects the bids submitted through a complex sequential process beginning with (1) which auctions 
to visit, (2) which auction to bid in, and (3) what amount to bid. Lim et al. (2016) showed these 
sequential dependencies are driven primarily by the propensity to search, which is a function of 
information and history.  
To summarize, auctions as a participative pricing mechanism are effective at increasing 
revenues, in part due to behavioral considerations including empowerment, emotions, sequential 
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dependencies, and competitive arousal. These behavioral effects are in turn dependent on careful 
auction design, starting with the decision regarding whether to conduct a sealed-bid or open format.  
Future research is needed to determine the conditions under which competitive intensity and 
arousal influence bidding behavior and auction outcome, and what factors mediate or moderate 
this relationship. In addition, more research is needed to study optimum strategies for selling 
competing products. In particular, under what conditions is it best to use either sequential, 
simultaneous, or partial overlapping auctions? Also, what is the best way to sell complementary 
products either as separate components or as bundles (e.g., Popkowski Leszczyc, and Häubl 2010)? 
Finally, more general research is needed to compare the differences between participative pricing 
with and without buyer competition. For a seller, what participative pricing strategy generates the 
highest revenue? 
5. Outcome and Process Utility in Participative Pricing 
A reasonable assumption about consumers is that they welcome the opportunity to influence the 
purchase price. Because people generally prefer to pay less for the products and services that 
interest them, any mechanism that transfers (some) control over the final price must be appealing. 
In reality, however, consumers often behave in a manner that contradicts this intuition. For 
example, several studies reveal people are remarkably generous under a PWYW regime: they pay 
significant sums for something they can actually have for free. A common explanation for this 
observation is that participative pricing mechanisms prime some social preference—including 
altruism, inequity aversion, and reciprocity—that, in turn, motivates payments (Gneezy et al. 2010; 
Haws and Bearden 2006; Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009; Regner and Barria 2009; Schmidt, Spann, 
and Zeithammer 2015). Alternatively, Mak et al. (2015) posit that PWYW, the most extreme 
participative pricing mechanism, in effect transforms a private good into a public one, and 
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consumers understand their payments in the present guarantee the provision of the good in the 
future. Finally, in the context of auctions, Ding et al. (2005) show theoretically and empirically 
that emotions such as excitement and frustration aroused by the pricing mechanism itself (the “joy” 
and “frustration” of the game) affect the magnitude of bids.  
Another observation that contradicts the above intuition is that, far from being delighted, 
many consumers who are offered control over the final price decide to opt out of the purchase 
altogether. According to Gneezy et al. (2012), identity and self-image concerns motivate this 
response: people who want to pay less than a figure they consider appropriate or reasonable 
experience embarrassment, which, if sufficiently strong, pushes them to abandon the purchase (for 
similar arguments, see Ariely, Bracha, and Meier [2009] and Hazard [2016]). Alternatively, 
Chernev (2003) and Spann et al. (2012) argue consumers naturally prefer to select rather than 
generate prices, particularly when no salient reference point exists: the absence of a clear 
benchmark results in decision fatigue, which can lower interest in the purchase. Similarly, Einav 
et al. (forthcoming) demonstrate with data from eBay that people are essentially willing to pay a 
premium for products to avoid the (perceived) hassle costs of taking part in auctions.7 
Reconciling the way consumers ought to react to participative pricing mechanisms with the 
way they actually do is possible if we consider the possibility that individuals derive satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction from not only outcomes (the difference between what they get and what they 
give up in a transaction), but also the underlying processes that generate them. A formal descriptive 
account of utility from the process, hereby defined as the subjective experience evoked by 
                                                     
7 Casual empiricism aligns nicely with this finding. For instance, recently several car manufacturers instituted “no 
haggling” policies at dealerships to attract the business of customers, primarily women, who are put off by the 
thought of bargaining with a car salesperson. 
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participation in the process of setting a price, may have the following characteristics. 8  
Consider a market in which a firm sells a product to consumers. The firm incurs a marginal 
production cost of c per unit, with 0 < c < 1. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of the 
product, and ri, is consumer i’s WTP for the product. To capture heterogeneity, we let r be a 
random variable that is drawn from a probability density function (r), with the corresponding 
cumulative distribution function (r) defined over [0,1]. We consider cases in which the firm 
chooses to let consumers participate in the pricing decision. Consumer i’s utility from purchasing 
a product is given by 
(1) ui = ri – pi - max{(pi - ri0), 0} – max{(ri0 - pi), 0} + {pricing strategy},  
where pi is the price paid by consumer i, and ri0 is the “fair” price perceived by the consumer.  
The parameters  and  are two positive constants such that max{(pi - ri0), 0} captures the 
consumer’s disutility toward disadvantageous inequality and max{(ri0 - pi), 0} captures the 
consumer’s disutility toward advantageous inequality (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). The parameter  
is a constant that captures the consumer’s utility (or dis-utility) from participating in setting prices, 
and {pricing strategy} is a function that captures the amount of consumer participation in the 
pricing strategy, such that {pricing strategy} captures the overall (dis)utility from the 
consumer’s participation. Chao, Fernandez, and Nahata (2015) analyze an analogous theoretical 
model, showing PWYW pricing can be more profitable than posted pricing. They identify another 
benefit: increased efficiency of the market. 
In our mind, the first opportunity for research on utility from process is to create a 
                                                     
8 Note our concept of utility from process is not unique in the domain of pricing. For example, considerable research 
has investigated the perceptions of fairness in response to the pricing actions of sellers. Importantly, fairness 
typically has two dimensions: one related to the outcome (the price level) and another related to the process (how 
the price came to be) (Campbell 1999). 
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comprehensive catalog of motivating factors. The impact of participating in the pricing decision 
on purchase behavior has different origins. We already discussed social preferences, uncertainty, 
decision fatigue, decision conflict, image concerns, and emotions, but other sources are likely, both 
situational and dispositional. In particular, the need exists to make sense of this landscape, and as 
such, a useful contribution may be a conceptual framework that unifies and puts order to the current 
knowledge.  
Second, and perhaps more important, different theories have different consequences on the 
likelihood of making a purchase and/or actual payments. Another issue is identifying and 
examining moderating variables that determine the direction of the net effect. One example is the 
work of Chandran and Morwitz (2005), which shows PWYW increases purchase incidence and 
generates revenue on par with the standard posted-price regime only for people who enjoy 
negotiations and usually take an active part in the shopping process (those considered to have a 
higher degree of control over their shopping decisions). 
The third avenue we see for future research is to distinguish between direct and indirect links 
from process utility to outcomes. Direct links are more conventional: consumers derive pleasure 
or pain from the pricing mechanism itself, which affects their purchase behavior. But this pleasure 
or pain may also change (in ways that perhaps escape awareness and volition) how consumers 
perceive payoffs, in which case the impact is indirect. For example, how responses are collected 
might affect bidding behavior. Response formats vary not only across the physical and virtual 
domain, but also within each type. A case in point is Priceline’s approach to NYOP on its website 
versus its mobile application: the company uses an open-ended textbox to elicit bids on the website, 
but a sliding scale to do the same on the mobile application. Meanwhile, Thomas and Kyung (2017) 
demonstrated through a series of experiments that sliding scales intensify aggressiveness and 
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influence bid values.  
Finally, an interesting question is whether consumers habituate to pricing mechanisms. That 
is, although the process may influence consumers at first, is this relation consistent across time and 
exposures? One argument against a sustained effect is that with repetition come norms, and 
therefore consumers naturally become sensitized. 
6. Applications of Participative Pricing in Selected Domains 
In this section, we discuss applications of participative pricing mechanism in three domains: B2B, 
advertising, and charity auctions. We selected B2B mechanisms because they constitute the largest 
proportion of electronic commerce in dollar terms (Lucking-Reiley and Spulber 2001). 9  We 
selected advertising, because in terms of number of auctions being run daily, advertising auctions 
have no match—more than a hundred million advertising auctions take place per day (Försch et al. 
2017). We selected fundraising because it is a fast-growing sector of the economy (Giving USA, 
2017), wherein innovative participative pricing methods are both sorely needed and readily 
adopted (Huck and Rasul 2011; Shang and Croson 2009; Eckel, Herberich, and Meer 2017), but 
also because charity and fundraising are the most naturally occurring applications of PWYW 
pricing, which is one of the main mechanisms discussed in this article.  
6.1. Business-to-business transactions 
Most of the work on B2B auctions are participative reverse auctions in which a buyer initiates a 
bidding event and potential suppliers bid the prices down; these events are generally buyer 
                                                     
9 US B2B e-commerce sales are expected to top $1 trillion by 2019; see Forrester Research B2B e-Commerce Forecast, 
2015 to 2020 at https://www.pepperi.com/wholesale-ecommerce/. 
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determined (Jap 2003),10 meaning the auction may not determine the ultimate winner, as additional 
non-price criteria are considered in the winner selection.  
Differentiated bidders. Such mechanisms are necessitated because of product, service and 
bidder heterogeneity. One response has been the use of multidimensional pricing mechanisms in 
which the buyer specifies its ex-ante weights for non-price aspects (Anton and Yao 1987; Boger 
and Liao 1988, Chen-Ritzo et al. 2005, Mayer 1987, Riordan and Sappington 1987). In practice, 
these mechanisms are cumbersome, because the weights can be difficult to determine in advance. 
An alternative is to couple a price-based mechanism with forms of non-competitive contracts 
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Haruvy, and Katok 2007) or to use a two-stage process (Tunca and Wu 
2009).  
More recent research has focused on the role of information. Bidders pay higher prices when 
winner identities are concealed (Lu et al. 2016); anonymizing winning bids might discourage tacit 
collusion and declining prices. Pilehvar et al. (2016) find first bidders are influenced by their past 
bidding behavior (an internal reference price) and also monitor concurrent prices in other open and 
just-finished auctions (external reference prices), and these behaviors are moderated by bidder 
heterogeneity (i.e., a bidder’s experience and cross-bidding across comparable concurrent 
auctions).  
Interorganizational relationships. Relationships between the participants also critically 
influence mechanism performance and outcomes. The most robust result is that auctions reduce 
trust, increase dysfunctional conflict, and ultimately undermine suppliers’ non-price performance 
in the exchange (Carter and Kaufmann 2007). Research also shows auctions increase suspicions 
                                                     
10 As noted in section 2, a B2B procurement reverse auction can also be viewed as an auction wherein the product to 
be sold is a contract offered by the procuring company or government (the seller), with suppliers playing the roles 
of buyers. 
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of buyer opportunism, even when the buyer is not acting opportunistically (Jap 2003, 2007). 
Auctions not only sour bidder satisfaction with the buyer, but also alter the bidder’s propensity or 
willingness to strengthen or improve its relational position with the buyer (Jap and Haruvy 2008).   
Relationships have been shown to alter bidding strategies and aggression; high-quality 
bidders are more aggressive against potentially higher-quality competition and less aggressive 
against lower-quality competitors (Haruvy and Jap 2013). By contrast, low-quality bidders bid 
aggressively regardless of their implied quality vis-a-vis the competition. Extant organizational 
relationships incorporate differentiation information and lead bidders to adjust their bidding 
strategy accordingly.  
Future research. PWYW mechanisms might be effective for acquiring new service 
customers. Design firm StackSocial offers its customers a designer bundle of products, each with 
a suggested price. 11 People who pay above the average price receive the entire bundle, and all 
others receive a reduced version. From the seller’s perspective, what part of the offering is 
acceptably “free” or not paid for? Do customers understand this offer? How does such a 
mechanism compare to a target conversion rate or move customers along a conversion life cycle? 
Susan Graham (Susan G IT Consulting) leaves the amount of the first month’s fee up to the 
customer, and this approach has led to significant annual growth and heightened trust. Previously, 
clients would be guarded, but with a PWYW model, they valued her more because they could 
determine how much her services were worth to them.  
Another direction is the roles of guarantees, premiums, and penalties. Suppliers might offer 
a guarantee, or commit to product ownership if it does not sell, and charge sellers a commission 
for prices that exceed the guarantee. This approach profits sellers at the expense of the market 
                                                     
11 From https://stacksocial.com/sales/pay-what-you-want-b2b-designer-bundle, accessed on 12/1/2016. 
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maker when sellers are powerful (cf., Greenleaf et al 2002). Suppliers might also use buy-in 
penalties with sellers to motivate a lower reserve to increase expected revenues. Greenleaf and 
Sinha (1996) have found these typically Pareto-dominated pricing mechanisms rely on seller 
commissions. 
6.2. Advertising 
Historically, most advertisements were sold by sales representative who either used a posted price 
or negotiated a long-term contract with a uniform price for all ads. This pricing mechanism was 
essentially turned upside down when search engines such as Yahoo and Google started to use 
auctions and not posted prices to sell advertising slots in their search-engine results (Varian and 
Harris 2014). In response, search-engine marketing became the most prominent online marketing 
instrument in most countries, and nowadays, all prominent search engines, namely, Google, Bing, 
and Yahoo in Western countries, and Baidu and Yandex in China and Russia, sell their ad slots in 
their search-engine results via real-time auctions.  
Not until years later were real-time auctions also used to sell slots for online display 
advertisements, which created the “real-time bidding” (RTB) industry. Today, however, nearly 
every time a user visits a website (Lee, Jalali, and Dasdan 2013; Varian and Harris 2014), an 
auction takes place to sell the respective advertisement for this user. Often an ad exchange is used 
that runs these auctions in less than 200 milliseconds. Försch, Heise, and Skiera (2017) report on 
an advertising exchange that performs on average 97.5 million auctions per day, which equals 
1,128 auctions per second. Obviously, computer algorithms bid on behalf of (human) advertisers 
according to pre-specified bidding strategies. These auctions offer advertisers an opportunity to 
buy each impression at a price that reflects the value of a single impression, and publishers can 
sell each impression to the highest-bidding advertiser.  
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Most of these auctions are second-price sealed-bid auctions, which show large similarities 
with Vickrey auctions. In terms of the number of transactions, the “Vickrey” auction is thus by far 
the most popular auction format in history (Zeithammer 2016). However, the RTB industry was 
innovative in making small changes to Vickrey auctions, which creates fascinating opportunities 
for future research. Among these changes are soft floors and hard floors. The hard floor acts as a 
minimum price below which an impression is not sold. It is similar to what the auction literature 
usually calls a reserve price. The soft floor turns the second-price auction into a first-price auction 
if the advertiser bids below the soft floor (Försch, Heise, and Skiera 2017; Zeithammer 2016). The 
theoretical analysis of Zeithammer (2016) suggests soft floors should not have any impact on the 
seller’s profit, but the empirical study of Försch, Heise, and Skiera (2017) outlines it does. The 
reason is that Zeithammer (2016) captures the equilibrium that will be reached in the long term, 
and Försch, Heise, and Skiera (2017) look at short-term reactions. An interesting but open question 
is how long it will take to reach the equilibrium. 
Another interesting future research area deals with the design of the auctions to sell 
advertising slots. Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) and Varian and Harris (2014) outline 
the subtle differences between Vickrey-Clarke-Goves (VCG) auctions (of which the Vickrey 
auction is a special case) and generalized second-price (GSP) auctions. Bidding the true value is a 
dominant strategy in VCG auctions but not in GSP auctions. Still, which one is more profitable is 
not clear, and sellers also sometimes provide more weight to the bid of some advertisers or reveal 
more information to some advertisers than others. A better understanding of the impact of these 
alternative auction designs on the profit of sellers and buyers is certainly required.  
6.3. Charity auctions and fundraising 
Price premiums in charity auctions. An important question for academics and practitioners is the 
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price premium consumers are willing to pay for charity. Participative pricing mechanisms are in 
particular suitable for charity settings in which consumers may be willing to pay a premium. 
Charity settings have widely used auctions in particular. Several papers have compared charity 
versus non-charity auctions and have measured the premium consumers are willing to pay 
(Elfenbein, Fisman, and McManus 2012; Elfenbein and McManus 2010; Haruvy and Popkowski 
Leszczyc 2009; Popkowski Leszczyc, and Rothkopf (2010). The donation percentage (Haruvy and 
Popkowski Leszczyc 2009, Popkowski Leszczyc and Rothkopf 2010), seller reputation (Elfenbein 
et al. 2012), and the type of product (Popkowski Leszczyc et al. 2015) moderate this charitable 
premium.  
Bidder charitable preferences or motivations. Research has suggested bidders are willing to 
pay a premium in charity auctions because they obtain additional utility from money going to 
charity (Goeree et al. 2005). Studies of charitable motives have found charitable bidders receive 
utility from charity, even when they lose, providing them with an incentive to drive up prices (He 
and Popkowski Leszczyc 2013; Popkowski Leszczyc et al. 2015; Popkowski Leszcyc and 
Rothkopf 2010). Finally, Haruvy, and Popkowski Leszczyc (2009) found segments with different 
charitable preferences: a non-charitable or selfish segment, a segment that gives for selfish reasons 
(a warm-glow segment), and a segment that gives for selfless reasons. These segments differed 
significantly in the charitable premium they were willing to pay in charity auctions. The selfless 
segment was willing to pay a significantly higher premium for greater donations to charity. 
Fundraising format. The all-pay auction, in which every bidder pays his highest bid, is an 
increasingly popular auction format with the potential to generate higher revenues (Engers and 
McManus 2007). An all-pay auction is a type of auction in which all bidders pay some amount 
regardless of whether they win (Kim et al. 2014). Applications of all-pay auctions include papers 
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on penny auctions (Platt, Price, and Tappen 2013; Augenblick 2015) and charity auctions 
(Carpenter, Homes, and Matthews 2008).12   
Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc (2016) conducted a large-scale field experiment 
comparing revenue and bidding behavior in winner-pay and voluntary-pay auctions in both charity 
and non-charity settings. The volunteer-pay auction is a specific variety of the all-pay auction in 
which losing bidders are asked to pay an amount equal to their highest bid. The authors found 
significantly higher revenues in the volunteer-pay auctions than in the winner-pay format in a 
charity setting. However, those results are reversed in a non-charity setting. This finding suggests 
such auction formats are well suited for charity settings, wherein losing consumers are less 
concerned with paying, because the money goes to a good cause.  
Future research in charity auctions and fundraising. Empirically testing alternative auction 
formats in a charity setting is needed, including different all-pay formats in charity settings, in 
which bidders have to pay a fee for bidding (Kim et al. 2014; Spann, Zeithammer, and Häubl 2010). 
More research is also needed to study how different motivations influence consumers’ WTP in 
charity auctions and in cause-related marketing settings (Koschate-Fischer, Stefan, and Hoyer 
2012, Andrews et al. 2014), and how consumers respond to small-donation promises. Future 
research should also focus on other participative pricing mechanisms in a charity setting. Gneezy 
et al. (2010, 2012) studied PWYW pricing in a charity setting. Gneezy et al. (2010) reported 
significantly higher profitability with PWYW prices than with fixed prices, when 50% of proceeds 
were donated to charity.  
                                                     
12In penny auctions, bidders need to pay a fee for each bid placed in an auction (websites currently in operation are 
Beezid.com, QuiBids.com, BidSauce.com, DealDash.com, and HappyBidDay.com).  
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7. Conclusion 
Participative pricing mechanisms offer several highly promising avenues for future research, 
which we discussed in sections 3-6 according to our taxonomy outlined in Table 1. Table 2 
provides an overview of specific research questions related to each participative pricing 
mechanism. 
Table 2: Research questions for participative pricing mechanisms 
Class of 
Mechanism  
/ Topic 
Mechanism 
/ domain 
Research Questions 
No Buyer 
Competition 
Interactive 
NYOP 
 Profitability of NYOP compared to posted pricing 
 Impact of transaction environment on profitability 
 Buyer behavior and deviations from rationality 
 Optimal design of NYOP 
 Outcome and process utility of NYOP 
Bargaining 
 Combination of bargaining with other participative 
pricing mechanisms 
 Choice between bargaining formats (e.g. deadlines, 
counter offers) 
No Buyer 
Competition 
Not interactive 
PWYW 
 Generalization of applicability of PWYW for 
specific situations 
 Analysis of the role of uncertainty in PWYW (e.g., 
buyer’s uncertainty on what is a fair price) 
 Timing of payments in PWYW (e.g., before or after 
service) 
Buyer 
Competition 
Interactive 
Auctions with active 
seller participation  
 Impact of auction design on perceived buyer 
empowerment and emotions 
 How competitive intensity and arousal influence 
bidding behavior and auction outcome 
 Analysis of eBay best offer mechanism 
 Competing products: under which conditions use 
sequential, simultaneous, or partial overlapping 
auctions 
 Complementary products: sell as separate 
components or as bundles 
Buyer 
Competition 
Not interactive 
Auctions without 
active seller 
participation 
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 Compare the differences between participative 
pricing with and without buyer competition  
Outcome and 
process utility 
all 
 Classify specific effects of process utility 
 Consequences of different effects of process utility 
 Differences between direct and indirect links from 
process utility to outcomes 
 Consumer learning and habituating to participative 
pricing mechanisms 
Areas of 
application 
B2B 
 Explore PWYW for service components in B2B 
transactions 
 Explore the role of price guarantees, premiums, and 
penalties in B2B transactions 
Advertising 
 Analyze the effect of hard and soft floors in 
second-price sealed-bid auctions 
 Analyze differences between auction designs to sell 
advertising slots (e.g., VCG and GSP auctions) 
Charity 
 Test different participative pricing mechanisms in a 
charity setting (auction and PWYW formats).  
 How do consumers respond to small donation 
promises in cause related marketing settings  
 
Summarizing the mechanism-specific questions (see Table 2), we can identify three areas 
for future research on participative pricing mechanisms: 
The first set of research questions focuses on the prevalence, profitability, and optimal 
design of participative pricing mechanisms. More research is needed that compares different 
participative pricing mechanisms to determine which mechanisms are most suitable (profitable) 
and under what conditions. We discussed why NYOP is not more frequently used and how this 
underutilization may be related to current NYOP sellers not (yet) adopting optimal design 
recommendations. Related, a further investigation of the downstream consequences of 
participative pricing mechanisms may identify not only additional benefits (e.g., satisfaction, 
repeat purchases, word of mouth), but also obstacles (e.g., revenue dilution) that may explain the 
mechanisms’ limited popularity. Additionally, the nature of uncertainty (for the seller: cost of 
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goods sold; for the buyer: acceptance of bid and experienced utility) and the timing of the payment 
(i.e., before or after the service) are likely to affect seller profitability and buyer behavior. 
A second set of research questions relates to bidder/buyer behavior in participative pricing 
mechanisms. The task to come up with a dollar number for a bid/offer can be challenging for 
consumers, and the behavioral mechanisms behind this process need better understanding. Related, 
we see consumers opt out of participating in price settings (e.g., in PWYW). An explanation worth 
investigating in addition to the outcome utility is the idea of “process utility” (the process to get to 
the outcome). Modeling process utility (which may include cognitive costs, image concerns, etc.) 
seems like a fruitful avenue to better understand when customers participate in pricing. As noted 
in section 5, cataloging the various drivers of process utility—cognitive fatigue, enjoyment, 
bidding frenzy, metacognitive uncertainty—would be managerially relevant as well as 
theoretically insightful. Additionally, delineating the direct and indirect effects of process utility 
on transactions is a promising area for further research. Several factors such as response formats 
can subtly influence process utility, without the consumers’ awareness or volition, and thus 
indirectly change outcome utility. 
A third set of research questions relates to new participative pricing formats and specifics of 
the application of participative pricing mechanisms in the business-to-business domain. For 
example, we observe an increased application of the all-pay auction format, such as keyword-
search auctions, crowdsourcing, and procurement (i.e., all instances in which bidders need to make 
some initial investment but only one winner might be possible). However, empirical applications 
are almost non-existent. Therefore, determining the revenue implications and bidding strategies of 
bidders in this format is important. How do all-pay auctions perform relative to winner-pay 
auctions? Also, how does this format perform in charity and non-charity settings? Within the 
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business-to-business domain, particularly in the area of industrial purchasing, infinite 
opportunities remain for better understanding the phenomenon of participative pricing. Research 
has not considered the effectiveness of mechanisms such as PWYW and NYOP in the context of 
ongoing industrial procurement relationships. Relational exchanges between organizations are 
those marked by a high degree of trust and commitment, both perceived and real. In such a context, 
one could expect to see very different PWYW and NYOP responses, because the social and 
exchange norms between the players might powerfully alter or even reverse their choice responses 
from that of a single-encounter transaction or even a transactional relationship context. 
Ultimately, an increased understanding of these key theoretical insights benefits all 
researchers studying questions of customer-driven pricing mechanisms. By understanding how the 
behavioral factors drive buyer behavior and seller profit, we see a rich array of avenues for future 
research as well as managerial practice. 
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